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soviet[w87,jmc]		Soviet negotiation policy

	These thoughts were inspired by hearing a Rand Corporation
expert discuss the history of Soviet views of arms control.  It
seems to me that he had too much of an image of Soviet leaders
and their advisers as being like Rand Corporation games theorists.

	In fact the communist system implies that Soviet policy
is formed quite differently from ours and depends in a different
way on the opinions of the people forming it.  The communist system
inhibits and even prevents open discussion of many
policy issues even among insiders.  It prevents individuals from
maintaining long term open positions on many issues.  If an individual
were asked what he thinks Soviet policy should be on an issue, the only
prudent answer is that the policy should be what it currently is.  It
is even dangerous to have too many opinions on what the policy should
have been in the past.

	The top man, Gorbachev today, has greater freedom, but we can't
know how much.  Maybe he himself doesn't know how much.

	The consequence is that drastic changes in policy are possible,
provided the innovators are successful in managing the necessary
coalitions.  These coalitions will rarely be formed on the basis of
positions on the issue but rather on the basis of ambitions for power.
Khrushchev was successful in drastically changing the attitude towards
the memory of Stalin.  When he was ousted, it wasn't really because he
went against public opinion among the Central Committee, but because
he hadn't handled the politics of position and power well.

	Therefore, in figuring what agreements with Gorbachev are
possible, we shouldn't be too influence either by game-theoretic
considerations or by what we read in Pravda.  We need to keep an
open mind when we explore what the possibilities are.